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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore how a natural law based jurisprudential 
philosophy would have proved superior to the Austinian legal positivist prepositions that 
the Allies worked from in the Nuremberg Trials. This is achieved through defining 
natural law as it was classically understood by its historical advocates such as Thomas 
Aquinas and Sir William Blackstone. Natural law’s applicability to the Trials builds off 
the principles articulated by those writers. In the process of making this determination, as 
to why natural law represents a viable jurisprudential idea, this paper addresses the 
fundamental conflict between natural law and legal positivism as articulated by John 
Austin, and positivism’s subsequent influences upon the defense and the Allies in their 
attempts to prosecute the Nazi leaders at Nuremberg. 
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Natural Law and Legal Positivism in the Nuremberg Trials 
In the realm of jurisprudence, there are many different legal theories. Two in 
particular have proven to be very influential in the development of Western legal 
tradition: natural law and legal positivism. Natural law holds, essentially, that there is a 
fundamental moral law or moral source of law above man, the basic precepts of which 
are reasonably knowable. Man-made law, in order to be just, should be in accordance 
with and not violate those precepts or principles that natural law articulates. In contrast 
legal positivism, as articulated by John Austin, basically holds that law and morality are 
fundamentally distinct and separated.  Rather than hold man-made law up to a moral 
standard in order to determine its validity, legal positivism maintains that law is valid 
simply by virtue of the command of the “sovereign” (Altman, 2001, p. 74). Though it is 
preferred that law coincide with morality is subjectively preferable, objectively speaking, 
morality has nothing to do with that law’s validity as law (Altman, p. 68). 
Given these brief definitions, it is easy to see that both of these theories are 
fundamentally at odds. The prominence of one theory necessarily heralds the demise of 
the other. Historically, perhaps no set of trials shows the elemental conflict between these 
two theories on the validity of law more than the Nuremberg Trials. The Nuremberg 
Tribunal, created as the judicial arm of the United Nations to try leading Nazi war 
criminals, worked from fundamentally Austinian positivist prepositions; namely that the 
validity of law comes from its creation by the sovereign and that morality has no bearing 
on the substance of the law (Altman, 2001, pp. 68-74). The Nuremberg trials presented 
internationally, for all to see, John Austin’s command theory and his “seperability” 
thesis, or that legality and morality are fundamentally separated (Austin, 1954, p. 15). 
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 Natural law was largely cast by the wayside throughout the trial of the Nazi 
criminals. At most, natural law served as a rhetorical device to give moral bite into some 
aspects of the trial, such as the prosecution’s Justice Robert Jackson’s opening statement, 
where he asks, “does it take these men by surprise that murder is treated as a crime?” 
(The Law of the Case section, para. 9). The fact of the matter is, were it not for the 
tribunal’s prior philosophical commitment to positive law, natural law would have served 
as the better legal philosophy to try the vicious crimes of the Nazis. To give any proper 
consideration to the question of whether natural law could have been a viable basis of 
jurisprudence during the Nuremberg trials, one must first lay out some preliminaries: the 
basis for the Nuremberg war crime trials, the Allies’ and defendants’ utilization of 
Austin’s legal positivism, what is meant by legal positivism and natural law, and finally 
the application of natural law on crimes of international import. 
Setting the Stage at Nuremberg 
This section will briefly articulate how the Nuremberg trials came into being, 
whom specifically among the Nazi leadership were tried, the charges they faced, and the 
trial’s outcome. Before articulating the basic precepts and definition of natural law and 
the tenets of legal positivism, we need to establish the historical stage on which this 
drama is to take place. As previously iterated, Nuremberg was the creature of the United 
Nations. The four victorious Allies of the Second World War, the United States, Great 
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, were given charge of overseeing the trial. The 
tribunal that supervised Nuremberg originates with the formulation of the United Nations. 
This occurred in August of 1945 when the Treaty of London was signed, shortly 
after the defeat of Nazi Germany (Washington, 2008, p. 17). In the Treaty of London, the 
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Allied powers concluded an “Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the 
Major War Criminals of the European Axis,” in which they declared their intention to 
establish an International Military Tribunal for the trial of those war criminals “whose 
offenses have no particular geographical location” (Paulson, 1975, p. 137). The Charter 
of the Tribunal, annexed to the Agreement granted jurisdiction over crimes against peace, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and over conspiracy to commit the crimes as 
they were defined in the Charter (Paulson, p. 138). 
The tribunal continued to take shape over the series of several conferences 
between the Allies, including the Yalta Conference (Feb. 4-11, 1945), and the Potsdam 
Conference (Aug. 2, 1945) (Washington, 2008, p. 17). At Yalta, the Allies determined to 
specifically try the German leaders as war criminals (Washington, p. 17). At Potsdam the 
Allied powers drew up the “Potsdam Protocol” which authorized the four Allies would 
prosecute separate parts of the Nuremberg Trials Washington, p. 17). Additionally at the 
Potsdam Conference the location for the Trial was set upon. There are two reasons as to 
why Nuremberg, a small industrial city in Bavaria, was chosen to be the location of the 
trials. According to Washington (2008) the first was symbolic; Nuremberg was the town 
where in 1935 Hitler’s infamous discrimination laws were first drafted. These deprived 
the Jews of all their civil rights (p. 18). The second reason was pragmatic; Nuremberg 
was one of the few cities left that was still relatively intact in the aftermath of the 
systematic bombing of Germany (p. 18). The trials were held at the Nuremberg Palace of 
Justice from November 20th 1945 till October 1st 1946 (p. 19). 
The men on trial were high ranking officials in the Nazi party, government, and 
military. They were charged with “crimes against the peace,” including, “waging a war of 
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aggression, war crimes, genocide and mass murder” (Altman, 2001, p. 43). In addition, 
the defendants were charged with “conspiracy to commit the aforementioned crimes 
insofar as they formulated a common plan to carry them out” (Altman, p.43). 
 At Nuremberg, three of the highest Nazi officers, Adolph Hitler, Heinrich 
Himmler, and Josef Goebbels had committed suicide by the time the Trials were held, but 
Hermann Goering, Joachim Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel, Alfred Jodl, Ernst 
Kaltenbrunner, Julius Streicher, Hjalmar Schacht, Martin Bormann (in absentia), Karl 
Doenitz, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Hans Fritzsche, Walther Funk, Rudolf Hess, Erich 
Raeder, Alfred Rosenberg, Fritz Sauckel, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Albert Speer, Konstantin 
von Neurath, Franz von Paper, and Baldur von Schirach were tried one by one for 
individually specified crimes (Washington, 2003, p. 489) 
The specific charges brought against these men have their origins in the Treaty of 
London 1945. As stated previously, the Charter of the Tribunal granted jurisdiction over 
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and over conspiracy to 
commit the crimes as they were defined in the Charter (Paulson, 1975, 138). The 
following articles discussed in the agreement are particularly salient, as they defined the 
newly established crimes that the Nazi leaders would be tried under. 
Article 6(a) defines “crimes against peace”: 
Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or waging a war 
of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing. (Paulson, p. 138) 
Article 6(b) establishes “war crimes”: 
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War Crimes: Namely violations of the laws or customs of war.  Such violations 
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave 
labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, 
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war on the seas, killing of hostages, 
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or 
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. (Paulson, p. 138) 
Article 6(c) defines “crimes against humanity”: 
“Crimes Against Humanity: namely murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds 
in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal. (Paulson, 1975, p. 139) 
Lastly, a statement dealing with conspiracy appears in a paragraph following 
article 6(c) of the charter. Note that under this particular charge, the defendants were 
responsible for all actions committed by anyone carrying out the plan. 
Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation 
or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing 
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such 
plan. (Paulson, 1975, p. 139) 
 Despite the charges brought against the Nazis and the enormous amount of 
testimony gathered for the Trials, almost thirty percent of the twenty-four mentioned 
major Nazi leaders and one hundred twenty-eight lesser Nazi leaders were acquitted and 
walked away scot-free. Only eighteen percent received the death penalty (Washington, 
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2003, p. 486). The overwhelming majority of the defendants received token prison 
sentences. Indeed of the twenty-four major Nazi leaders who participated in the 
Holocaust twenty-one were convicted. But of these, only nine were sentenced to prison 
terms (with most freed within seven years) with the remaining twelve being sentenced to 
hang (Washington, p. 489). Given the sheer wickedness of the Nazis and the sickening 
amount of testimony against them the outcome was quite distasteful. “Light enough to 
please a chicken thief” as prosecutor Josiah DuBois angrily put it (Washington, p. 486). 
 One of the reasons for the light sentences could be that the tribunal, the 
prosecution, and defense were influenced by legal positivism. The Nazi defense attorneys 
in particular would utilize John Austin’s theory of legal positivism to great effect 
(Washington, 2003, 486). Two of the tenets of Austin’s legal positivism his Command 
Theory and the notion that there is a fundamental separation of law from morality would 
be key ideas in the Trials. Specifically, Austin’s Command Theory was utilized by the 
Nazi defense attorneys while the presupposition of the separation of morality and law lay 
underneath each side.  
Legal Positivism Defined 
In order to make good on the above assertion made that the Nuremberg Trials 
were influenced by legal positivism, we must first briefly define what exactly legal 
positivism is. This can best be understood by concisely examining how it came about, 
learning who articulated the theory, and articulating the applicable tenets of this theory in 
relation to Nuremberg. Once this is accomplished, then examination of legal positivism in 
the Trials would be in order. 
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The background history of legal positivism should ultimately be understood as a 
reaction to natural law. The clearest point of contention between the two theories is the 
question of the relationship between law and morality. Classical natural law theory has its 
roots in understanding the relationship between God, morality, law, and man’s created 
nature or the imago dei. The turn towards legal positivism occurred in nineteenth century 
as a result of a waning Enlightenment movement. The Enlightenment turned away from 
classical natural law with its roots in the relationship between man and God and 
embraced a more abstract and mechanistic concept of natural law. This was something 
that natural law writer William Blackstone (1975) warned against in his Commentaries 
on the Laws of England when he spoke of “perplex[ing] the law of nature with a 
multitude of abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of 
things” (p. 55). 
On the whole, Enlightenment naturalism—based on reason alone—led to a 
rationalistic conception of the natural law. As a result natural law became increasingly 
detached from its classical roots as characterizing the relationship between the nature of 
God and man: 
The Enlightenment…brought the dormancy of winter to natural law.  The term 
was bandied about, but its interpretation was radically changed, from situated 
precepts guided by human nature [the imago dei], historical experience, and 
prudence, to abstractions that neglected both their institutional history and their 
carefully crafted justifications. (Gray, 1999, p. 576) 
If we trace the history of legal positivism, it leads us back to Jeremy Bentham 
(1748-1832) who first articulated an early version of the theory, which was further 
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developed by John Austin’s positivist command theory of law (Altman 2001 pp. 64-66). 
Austin’s command theory in particular, was heavily utilized by the defense during the 
Nuremberg Trials. While some of Austin’s conceptions of legal positivism were 
explicitly rejected by the Nuremberg, one of the most key conceptions of positivism was 
retained: that law does not necessarily need to be linked to morality. Therefore it is with 
Austin’s particular form of legal positivism with which we are chiefly concerned. 
Where Austin and all forms of legal positivism diverge most fundamentally from 
the more traditional natural law theory is in its position on the role of morality in 
determining law’s validity. In contrast to natural law, legal positivism sees no necessary 
connection between morality and genuine legal obligation (Altman, 2001, p. 68). 
According to its adherents, the existence and contents of a law do not depend on whether 
or not it is based on a moral standard (Altman p. 68).  Indeed, in a passage outright 
rejecting the very idea that natural law is based on, Austin holds that “To say that human 
laws which conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is to say, are not law, is to 
talk stark nonsense” (Austin, 1954, p. 221). Law rather derives its legitimacy from being 
posited, that is, being brought legally into existence by a supreme legislative power 
(Altman, p. 74). The identity of the sovereign is not a question of legal right, but a 
question of who satisfies certain conditions. As he puts it in a well-known passage: 
The superiority which is styled sovereignty…is distinguished from other 
superiority…by the following marks or characters: 1. The bulk of the given 
society are in a habit of obedience or submission to a determinate and common 
superior…2. That certain individual, or that certain body of individuals, is not in a 
habit of obedience to a determinate human superior. (Austin, pp. 193-194) 
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In essence, a positivist will argue that legal obligation is explained in terms of 
power, coercion, control, and/or rules apart from standards of moral right or wrong. 
Austin’s theory of law heavily influenced American jurists. One of whom was the 
renowned Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the father of legal realism, a sister 
jurisprudence to legal positivism. Holmes held the idea outlined in his famous work, The 
Path of Law, that law should be viewed through the utilitarian lens as a tool of social 
control, experience, and raw statist power of a sovereign. Like Austin, Holmes embraced 
the idea that law is valid apart from any moral considerations. Indeed, Justice Holmes 
even exceeded Austin by declaring, “for my own part, I often doubt whether it would not 
be a gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether” 
(Holmes, 2009, p. 3). 
By the time of the Nuremberg Trials, it can be seen that legal positivism 
effectively replaced natural law as the dominant jurisprudential philosophy. The 
tribunal’s commitment to positivist’s conceptions of the separation of law and morality 
can be seen in the way that they respond to the Nazi defense’s arguments. Even more 
telling are the ways in which the prosecution, exemplified by Robert Jackson, approached 
the German question. 
Legal Positivism at Nuremberg 
With the definition of legal positivism and its articulation by John Austin we can 
now move onward toward examining how the Trials were influenced by his ideas. The 
defense for the Nazi leadership’s legal innocence relied heavily on positivism, 
particularly John Austin’s Command Theory. This use of Austin’s theory was pioneered 
by Nazi defense attorney Hermann Jarheiss, who was a professor of law at Cologne 
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(Washington, 2003, p. 494). In following Austin, Jarheiss seized upon the Allies’ 
positivist notion of international law when he asked: Can we as German citizens be 
judged by the Allied powers (i.e. other sovereign nations) under a higher law called 
international law? If so then neither Germany nor any of the Allied powers are sovereign 
states in the Austinian sense of the word (Washington, p. 494). By appealing to Austin’s 
legal positivism, Jarheiss set the philosophical boundaries in which the trial was to take 
place. This would shift the trial in the favor of the Nazis for a time while the Allies 
struggled with harmonizing their positivist ideas of sovereignty with an effective 
prosecutorial plan. 
In the meantime, Jarheiss capitalized on Austin as much as he could, relying on an 
“act of state” defense (Washington, 2003, p. 486). An act of state defense, following 
Austin’s logic, would hold that the laws that the Fuhrer, as the sovereign of Germany, put 
into action laws that were legally posited, and as such those laws demanded obedience.  
The individuals carrying out the “laws” would be under the protection of the state and 
absolved from any moral responsibility. They were only just “following orders.” The 
objective of these laws and military commands was that the Nazi’s systematic slaughter 
of Jews, gypsies, and other social undesirables. Furthermore, even though the Nazis had 
done morally reprehensible things, they could not be charged with guilt because morality 
is not a necessary component of the law. 
The Allies never gave a fully satisfactory response to Jarheiss’ use of Austin’s 
Command Theory his act of state defense, or the question of jurisdiction. Paulson, author 
of “Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg,” notes that the Allies rejection of these 
primary defenses of the Nuremberg Trials could not be “justified on either legal or 
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philosophical grounds.” Paulson derisively refers to this arbitrary decision as “Allied 
Policy” (Washington, 2003, p. 494). 
Now we must turn to the prosecution. While of course most legal positivists 
would hold that mass murder is wrong, outside posited law, they would have little basis 
for establishing reasons for it. The only way the dedicated legal positivists of the 
prosecution could ever legally condemn the actions of the Nazis was an appeal to a 
higher human law. This would take the form of international law as enforced by the 
tribunal and the United Nations. However, unfortunately for the Allies, the “sovereignty” 
of international law over Hitler’s Nazi Germany was limited to a precious few, vaguely 
worded treaties. Given Jarheiss’ contentions about German sovereignty, one of the 
biggest obstacles for the prosecution was the lack of legal authority these treaties made 
with the German regimes had with the Third Reich. This would be an obstacle that 
Robert Jackson, one of the chief prosecutors for the Allies would attempt to overcome by 
using a positivist approach to international law. 
Jackson centers his argument on the fact that Weimar Germany, prior to the rise 
of Hitler’s Nazi government, had entered into several treaties with other nations 
regarding rules of the conduct of warfare, such as the Kellogg-Briand pact which 
outlawed war (Delahunty, 2013, p. 76).  Jackson contended that Nazi Germany, despite 
changing regimes, was still obligated to abide by those agreements, and thus their willful 
disregard was cause for legal action taken by the Allied powers with whom the treaties 
were signed (Delahunty, p. 77).  Jackson points to the Weimar Constitution’s provision 
that “the generally accepted rules of international law are to be considered as binding 
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integral parts of the law,” and that the treaties signed were part of those “generally 
accepted rules” (Adams, 2000 p. 27). 
Perhaps one of the more revealing passages on how the Allied powers perceived 
international law as having a higher claim to national law comes from Robert Jackson’s 
opening statement. He sets out his claim that the Tribunal was taking part in a new era in 
which law would be brought upon lawlessness, a new time in which even the heads of 
nations would be answerable to the international community: 
The ultimate step in avoiding periodic wars, which are inevitable in a system of 
international lawlessness, is to make statesmen responsible to law.  And let me 
make clear that [when] this law is first applied against German aggressors…we 
are able to do away with domestic tyranny and violence and aggression by those 
in power against the rights of their own people when we make all men answerable 
to the law. This trial represents mankind's desperate effort to apply the discipline 
of the law to statesmen. (The Responsibility of This Tribunal section, para. 7) 
 However, Jackson notes how little regard the Nazi leadership had for international 
law, “They cannot show that they ever relied upon International Law in any state or paid 
it the slightest regard” (Adams, 2000, p. 26). Indeed Nuremberg psychiatrist Dr. G.M. 
Gilbert took note of the kind of rationalization employed by Nazi leaders to distance 
themselves from any perceived duty to honor international treaties. Dr. Gilbert (1948) 
remarks on the following conversation between one of the Nazi leaders on trial, Joachim 
von Ribbentrop, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the war, and Rudolph 
Hess, a fellow prominent Nazi politician: 
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Ribbentrop was arguing with Hess but getting nowhere, since Hess has no 
recollection of the world events recounted in the Indictment.  Ribbentrop then 
remarked to me “Why all this fuss about breaking treaties?  Did you ever read 
about the history of the British Empire?  Why, it’s full of broken treaties, 
oppression of minorities, mass murder, aggressive wars, and everything.” (p. 221) 
From Justice Robert Jackson’s own admission and Ribbentrop’s moral 
equivocation, it should be readily apparent that the Nazi’s cared little for the alleged 
sovereignty of an already rather weak foundation for international law, founded on the 
Tribunal’s adherence to a higher order international law under positivist presumptions. 
Nor did legal positivism do the Allies any favors in regards to overcoming Jarheiss’ 
arguments stemming from Austin. Rather than facing the implications of legal positivism 
and state sovereignty, the prosecution turned toward the ideals that the U.N. represented. 
That someday the heads of states would be answerable to the higher international 
community. 
Defining Natural Law 
Thus far, we have primarily discussed the Nuremberg Trials, its background, 
setting, and influences in the form of legal positivism. We have examined how positivism 
influenced the tribunal, the prosecution, and the defense. While natural law has been 
referred from time to time, it is in this section in which we shall more fully explore it and 
its implications. As stated previously, natural law holds that there is a fundamental moral 
law, or moral source of law, that is transcendent and preexisting (Aquinas, 1996, p. 52). 
The classic natural law position holds that the source of law is derived from the moral 
nature of God. Moreover, this moral law is tentatively knowable through exercise of right 
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reason in light of conscience. Why? The answer in classical natural law lies in the 
definition of “nature” and “natural.” 
In the context of the classical natural law tradition, human nature has its 
foundation in the imago dei; the image of God.  It is through the imago dei that the 
authority of God’s eternal law is engraved upon our very being. The Apostle Paul, in the 
book of Romans, called this, “the law written on the heart” (Romans 2:15 English 
Standard Version). God created mankind to be reflections of His moral nature. That is 
why man has unique capacities for morality, rationality, love, emotion, and free will. We 
are made to be partakers in God’s eternal law according to the nature He has given us. 
This is why St. Thomas Aquinas describes natural law as “the participation of the rational 
creature in the eternal law” (Budziszewski, 1997, p. 56). It is this participation in the 
eternal law of God which makes natural law valid as a source of morality and human 
enacted law. The significance of this participation is that our fundamental concepts of 
right and wrong, indeed the very idea of “rightness” or “wrongness,” do not arise solely 
from ourselves. It is not something that we make up. It is the result of a gifted nature, the 
imago dei, which God has inseparably woven and integrated into man’s very being. 
It follows that since God is good, and our nature is fashioned according to His 
image, that what is truly natural to us are actions and principles which correspond to that 
fundamental nature. Had the Fall never occurred, every inclination would be a natural 
inclination in keeping within our divine image-bearing nature. But the Fall did take place.  
We rebelled; the iron ring of the mind pulled away from the divine magnet, and in 
consequence the iron ring of the inclinations fell free (Budziszewski, 1999, p. 70). 
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Natural law is a study of teleology because in reflecting on inclinations that are in accord 
with nature, we can still trace something of the purposes they were meant to serve. 
Having established grounds for the preeminence of natural law as based in the 
imago dei, we can more readily see natural law in its universality. Thomas Aquinas, in 
his Treatise on Law (1274), points out that the general principles of the natural law are 
the same for all, both as to rectitude and to knowledge (p. 66). That is, basic moral 
precepts such as “do good and avoid evil,” “do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you,” and “do not murder the innocent” are universally recognized. C.S. Lewis 
(1952), writing about natural law in Mere Christianity illustrates this point: 
Try to think of a country where people were admired for running away in battle, 
or where a man felt proud for double-crossing all the people who had been kindest 
to him.  You might as well try to imagine a country where two and two made five. 
(p. 19) 
The fact that the general principles of natural law are the same for all in can even 
be seen in fallen human humanity. Even in a fallen state, people still have to justify their 
actions from primary moral principles, even if they do not overtly acknowledge them. 
(Budziszewski, 1997, p. 67). In order for ideologies to have any sort of appeal, they must 
cloak themselves in fundamental moral language and/or principles.  C.S. Lewis (1955), 
writing about natural law in the Abolition of Man, one of the most profound defenses of 
natural law written in the 20th century, illustrates this phenomenon. Lewis gives the 
example of an “Innovator” (i.e. someone who “creates” new values) who is a racist or 
extreme nationalist, and proclaims that all other values must either be channeled or yield 
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to the ultimate goal of the advancement of his own people (pp. 54-55). According to 
Lewis (1955), 
no kind of factual observation and no appeal to instinct will give him a ground for 
this opinion…he is in fact deriving it from the [natural law]: a duty to our own 
kin, because they are our own kin.  This is a part of traditional morality. But side 
by side with it in the [natural law], and limiting it, lie the inflexible demands of 
justice, and the rule that, in the long run, all men are our brothers. Whence comes 
the Innovator’s authority to pick and choose? (pp. 54-55) 
 In essence, the Innovator upholds one value that is derived from general 
principles of natural law; that we should honor our kin by upholding our duties to family, 
and extends the logic to his meta-kin, or race. Slavish adherence to this “new value” 
produces immorality because it fails to take into account other basic principles of natural 
law. Just as Lewis points out, justice is due to everyone not just our kinsmen, as all men 
are brothers because we all ultimately go back to Adam. The “new values” are actually 
fragments from the natural law itself, arbitrarily wrenched from their context and then 
swollen to madness. They still owe to natural law any shred of validity that they might 
possess (Lewis, p. 54). 
Natural law is universal and manifested in the way we articulate values. But what 
of natural law and actual man-made law itself? What is the interplay between them?  
Natural law lawyers throughout the ages have delved into this very question, but here it 
would be particularly appropriate to consult Sir William Blackstone (1723-1780), a 
famous English jurist and writer on natural law. 
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Blackstone (1979), in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, opens with an 
articulation of what law actually is. Accordingly law, in general, is seen as derived from 
God’s creative acts. “Law, in its most general and comprehensive sense, signifies a rule 
of action” which may apply “indiscriminately to all kinds of actions,” for example, laws 
of “gravitation, optics or mechanics.” (p. 54). Because God is the source of these physical 
laws, all of these are seen as “rules of action which are prescribed by some superior, and 
which the inferior is bound to obey” (p. 54). However, the difference between these 
natural laws of the universe, which govern inanimate objects, and the natural law 
governing human beings is very important: humans have free will (Blackstone, p. 55).  
However, human beings are just as dependent as any created entity on the Creator’s laws 
for their ultimate well-being and happiness. Blackstone (1979) describes this concept best 
when he writes: 
For [God] has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of 
eternal justice with the happiness of each individual, that the latter cannot be 
attained but by observing the former; and, if the former be punctually obeyed, it 
cannot but induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual connection of justice 
and human felicity, he has not perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of 
abstracted rules and precepts, referring merely to the fitness or unfitness of 
things…but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal 
precept, “that man should pursue his own true and substantial happiness.” (p. 55) 
Here it may be important to note that when Blackstone speaks here of “true and 
substantial happiness,” he is not referring to happiness as mere pleasure seeking as some 
dominant modernists philosophies such as utilitarianism maintain. Rather his concept of 
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happiness is more Aristotelian in nature. That is, true and substantial happiness 
(eudemonia) results from being virtuous and that this prime requisite of virtue be 
accompanied by its “equipment:” honor, external and bodily goods, and lastly pleasure 
which is merely a byproduct of these (Budziszewski, 1997, 21). Aristotle’s focus is on 
true happiness arising from virtue, a concept that Aquinas (1996) Christianized when 
speaking of the imago dei when he wrote that, “it…[is] a natural inclination to that which 
is in harmony with the eternal law [which is the Divine essence]; for we are naturally 
adapted to be the recipients of virtue” (p. 52). To return to Blackstone’s point, God, who 
is fundamentally the font of all righteousness, has ultimately designed us to be truly 
happy when we act in accordance with the imago dei, reflecting back to the Creator His 
own likeness. Building upon this, Blackstone (1979) holds that the natural law is the 
foundation upon which all other law must rest: 
This law of nature, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of 
course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all 
countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; 
and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, 
mediately or immediately, from this original. (p. 56) 
This concept of natural law covered here is the principle that man-made law, in 
order to be just, and thus assure its validity as law, should be made in accordance with 
those precepts or principles that natural law articulates. This concept of natural law 
actually goes back beyond Blackstone to some of the greatest Christian thinkers. It was 
first expressed by St. Augustine (354-430), who said that, “an unjust law is no law at all” 
(Aquinas, 1996, p. 78). Later this concept was more fully explored and articulated by St. 
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Thomas Aquinas. In answering the question of whether every human law is derived from 
the natural law, Aquinas (1996) replied in the following, 
Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the 
rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature…consequently 
every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the 
law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer 
a law but a perversion of law. (p. 78) 
Aquinas’s concept of law as fundamentally perverted when it violates the law of 
nature, has proven to be a boon to modern practitioners of nonviolent civil disobedience 
such as Martin Luther King Jr. King explicitly acknowledges his debt to Aquinas in the 
Letter from Birmingham Jail (p. 23). Furthermore, King expanded on Aquinas’s teaching 
on civil disobedience when he insisted that those who disobey an unjust law should do so 
publicly, explain the reasons publicly, and accept the legal consequences of their 
disobedience (pp. 23-24). In insisting on these principles, King made clear to everyone 
that in disobeying a particular law the protesters were not acting out of contempt for legal 
justice but out of a desire to uphold it. 
The International Force of Natural Law 
 In order to answer questions of natural law’s legitimacy as an international legal 
authority, we must first consider the alternative arrangement under legal positivism. 
Generally, in most discussions on law, we presuppose the legislative arm of the nation-
state as the primary source of positive law, and often nations operate similarly. 
International law under such conditions requires that nation-states give to up part of their 
sovereignty and submit to a greater international authority (Cutler, 2001, p.135). 
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Undoubtedly this is an unattractive notion for sovereign states that value their sovereignty 
(Cutler, p. 135). As we have seen in the example of Nazi Germany this approach to 
international law is of questionable value in light of the fact that there must be a 
submission of national autonomy. 
Samuel von Pufendorf, a prominent natural law thinker, viewed the law of nations 
as a reincarnation of natural law for nation-states. In other words, a moral law which all 
states are required to adhere (1991, p. 62). This is an important principle in that nation-
states are already required to adhere to a greater and higher authority of international law. 
Under this natural law writ large, nation-states do not have absolute authority of action 
apart from moral considerations within the bounds of their state. 
The implications of this line of thinking are compounded when one considers 
Hugo Grotius’s views on the equal validity of natural law on the actions of states as well 
as individuals, fleshing out the link between natural law and the law of nations. As 
Hommes (1983) explains, Grotius sees the laws of nature as being “equally valid for 
individuals and states” (p. 62). In essence, the precepts of natural law are not inherently 
limited to only individual persons, but to states as well (Hommes, p. 62). Just like any 
man before God, nation-states have a duty to their constituents to act in a moral manner, 
as the point of law is to promote men’s “security or convenience” (Pufendorf, 1991, 53). 
Classical international law theory asserts that the nation-state is bound to the 
natural law as much as the individual, it provides a solid basis for international relations. 
For the Nuremberg Tribunal the advantage of using the natural law would be manifold, 
for “if certain actions are right or wrong by nature at least there is a corpus of moral truth 
that is beyond dispute; the morality of the precepts of natural law are beyond dispute, that 
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they are not only right for all but known to all” (Budziszewski,1997, 83). Thus, natural 
law seems to require that both states and individuals prescribe to its precepts. As long as 
it holds individuals and states on equal moral ground, natural law does form a necessary 
foundation upon which to institutionalize international law and invest it with greater 
authority. 
Given the universal quality of natural law and the fact that nation-states as well as 
individuals are subject to it, it would be best to show an actual case building itself on 
natural law to further the point. Such a case would have to answer the sticky question of 
establishing jurisdiction. This is a question from the section dealing in legal positivism at 
Nuremberg that the tribunal never satisfactorily addressed under positivism. For 
advocates of natural law there is such a case that does indeed build upon principles of 
natural law. To make it even more relevant to the Nuremberg Trials, the case was 
concerned with an escaped Nazi leader that under the court’s ruling was brought to 
justice in the 1960s. This was the Eichmann Trial. 
The Eichmann Trial 
Adolf Eichmann was an Austrian member of the Nazi SS during the Second 
World War (Judgment, p. 68). He climbed through the ranks as an active bureaucrat and 
in November 1941 Adolf Eichmann achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel in the Nazi 
SS (Judgment, p. 86). He was put in charge of Section IVB4, this was to deal with 
“Jewish affairs, and evacuation affairs” which involved deporting Jews to concentration 
camps in occupied Eastern Europe (Judgment, p. 86). Specifically, Eichmann personally 
oversaw large-scale deportations of Jews to extermination camps at Belzec, Sobibor, and 
Treblinka in Poland (Judgment p. 139.) 
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At these camps hundreds of thousands of Jews were asphyxiated by gas on an 
industrial scale with as many as 600,000 at Belzec, and 250,000 at Sobibor, and 700,000 
at Treblinka, (Judgment pp. 139-143). Later, when the Allied Powers defeated Germany, 
Eichmann escaped to Argentina where he lived under a false name until he was tracked 
down and captured on May, 11 1960 by agents of the State of Israel (Judgment, p. 46). 
Eichmann was judged by the Jerusalem District Court on April, 11 1961 (Ardent, 1994, 
p. 244). He was indicted on 15 criminal charges including crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, crimes against the Jewish people, and membership in a criminal organization 
(Cesarani, 2005, p. 252). He was held accountable for the deplorable settings on board 
the concentration camp trains and for seizing Jews to fill those trains (Cesarani, pp. 310-
311). Eichman was found guilty of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes 
against Jews, Poles, Slovenes, and Gypsies. Additionally he was found guilty of being a 
member of an illegal organization, the SS (Cesarani, pp. 310-311). Eichmann was 
subsequently executed on May, 31 1962 (Cesarani, p. 320). 
There were several major obstacles that the Jerusalem Court under judges Landau, 
Halevi, and Raveh had to overcome to justify their indictment of Eichmann. Among these 
was the question of jurisdiction. What right did the Israeli government have to try 
Eichmann at all? As the Court stated, 
Relating to our jurisdiction to try this case, it is the duty of the Court to examine 
its competence ex officio even without the question being raised by the Accused; 
indeed, even if the Accused had consented to be tried by this Court, we would not 
have been entitled to try him unless the law empowers us to do so. (Judgment, p. 
3) 
NUREMBERG TRIALS   26 
The court ultimately appealed to natural law to provide the answer.  Their first 
task was to examine the “Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law of 1950” 
(hereinafter referred to as “the Law”) upon which they charged Eichmann under 
(Judgment 3). The Law was in danger of being dressed as being ex post facto since 
“carrying out an act constituting a crime against the Jewish People” was made a crime 
long after the existence of the Nazi regime (Judgment, p. 3). Addressing this question, the 
Court turned to Sir William Blackstone’s exposition of ex post facto laws.  Here 
Blackstone reads that an 
ex post facto of this objectionable class is those by which after an action 
Indifferent in itself is committed, the legislator then for the first time declares it to 
have been and crime and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has 
committed it.  Here it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action, 
innocent when it was done, should be afterwards converted to guilty by a 
subsequent law. (Judgment, p. 5) 
The Court held that the Law could not be seen as ex post facto, reasoning that mass 
murder forbidden by the Law could no way be construed as an “indifferent action in 
itself” and that “neither has the retroactive legislation dealt with a created new crime that 
had not hitherto been unknown” (Judgment, p. 5). In support of this assertion, the Court 
pointed out that all nations, Germany included, before and after the Nazi regime, had 
recognized mass murder as crime. Taking a note from Aquinas, the court said that the 
“law” and “criminal decrees of Hitler are not laws” (Judgment p. 6).  Pointing out that 
these laws had been set aside with retroactive effect, even by the German courts 
themselves (Judgment 6). Furthermore, the court argued that the very fact that the Nazis 
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took extensive measures “to efface the traces of their crimes” such as the destruction of 
the Gestapo archives clearly proved the Nazis guilty mind (Judgment, p. 6). 
 Having shown that the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law was not 
ex post facto through careful exposition of Blackstone, the Court turned to Blackstone, 
Coke, and Grotius to establish jurisdiction through application of law of nations. The 
rationale employed by the Court is an interesting one. The Court held that the genocidal 
crimes perpetrated by the Nazi leadership against several people groups of the world, 
including the Jews, gave the crimes a universal character. They note that, 
The abhorrent crimes defined in this Law are crimes not under Israeli law alone.  
These crimes which offended the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience 
of nations are grave offences against the law of nations itself.  In absence of an 
International Court, the international law is need of the judicial and legislative 
authorities of every country to bring criminals to trial.  The jurisdiction to try such 
crimes under international law is universal (Judgment, p. 9). 
To uphold this claim, the Israeli court noted the long standing tradition of 
universal authority under the law of nations (Judgment, p. 9). This goes far back as the 
Corpus Juris Civilis under which the towns of northern Italy had already in the Middle 
Ages taken to trying specific types of dangerous criminals (such as assassins) who 
happened to be within their jurisdiction, without regard to the places in which the crimes 
in question were committed (Judgment, p. 9). The Court then points out that maritime 
nations, such as Great Britain, have “since time immemorial enforced the principle of 
universal jurisdiction in dealing with pirates” as according to Sir Edward Coke who calls 
them “hostis humani generis” or “enemies of all mankind” (Judgment, p. 9).  
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Furthermore the Court calls on Blackstone to comment on the fact that pirates by their 
nature, 
[Have] renounced all the benefits of society and government, reducing himself 
afresh to the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind; all 
mankind must declare war against him. Every community hath a right by rule of 
self-defense to inflict that punishment upon him which every individual would in 
a state of nature have otherwise been entitled to do. (Judgment, p.10) 
Much like pirates or Italian outlaws, the Nazis through their lawless acts of mass 
genocide declared war against all mankind. The universal character of their crimes 
thereby opened themselves to universal jurisdiction. 
The last component of the Court’s rationale for the conviction of Eichmann 
concerns The State of Israel's “right to punish.” This would primarily be derived from 
natural law thinker Hugo Grotius who in 1625 wrote on an application of natural law to 
the law of nations in De Jure Bell ac Pacis that addresses the very question that the court 
sought to address. The Court draws attention to chapter 20 of Grotius’ work and notes 
that the author says that “in order that he who punishes may duly punish, he must possess 
the right to punish, a right deriving from the criminal’s crime” (Judgment, p. 10). 
The Court expounds on Grotius by acknowledging that the “object of punishment 
may be the good of the criminal, the good of the victim, or the good of the community” 
(Judgment, p. 10). Accordingly, the right of punishment under natural law allows for the 
victim to take the law into his own hands to punish the criminal, but these natural rights 
have been limited by organized society and delegated to the courts under the state 
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(Judgment, p. 10). Since these rights have been given to the sovereign state, the state may 
now prosecute such wrongdoing. For as Grotius articulates, 
it must be known that kings [i.e. sovereign states], and any who have the equal 
rights of kings, may demand that punishment be imposed not only for wrongs 
committed against them or their subjects, but also for all such wrongs as do not 
specifically concern them, but violate in extreme form any persons, the law of 
nature, or the laws of nations. (Judgment, p. 11) 
Seizing upon the principles articulated by Grotius, the court held that it was the moral 
duty of every sovereign state to enforce the natural right to punish, possessed by the 
victims of the crime whoever they may be, against criminals whose acts have “violated in 
extreme form the law of nature or the law of nations” (Judgment, p 11). 
To summarize, the “Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law” was held to 
be valid based on natural law principles of the ancient wrong of mass murder. It could not 
have been declared an ex post facto because of Blackstone’s distinction that an ex post 
facto “must be a crime that is indifferent in itself,” and in no good sense could genocide 
ever be construed as such (Judgment, p. 5). The problem of jurisdiction and similarly the 
right to punish were established by the Court’s interactions with the writings of Sir 
William Blackstone, Sir Edward Coke, and Hugo Grotius. 
Through Blackstone and Coke the Court invoked the ancient doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction, noting how the universal nature of the crimes being perpetrated (e.g. piracy) 
played a large role in determining that jurisdiction. Eichmann, who played a role in 
genocide of entire peoples committed just such a universal crime against mankind. 
Through Grotius, the Court was enabled to enact punishment on Eichmann seeing as it is 
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the  moral duty of every sovereign state to enforce the natural right to punish against 
criminals whose acts have “violated in extreme form the law of nature or the law of 
nations” (Judgment, p. 11). 
Conclusion 
Therefore natural law most certainly has a place in international relations. 
Because of natural law’s status as flowing from the eternal law of God, it has a place on 
the international stage. Its strength lies in its unique ability to be a compass accounting 
for nations, upholding them up to an intrinsic, transcendent standard of right and wrong. 
Natural law in its classic form is ancient and venerable. Positivism is recent and a 
rejection of natural law’s principles. Natural law is universal, applicable to all people, 
including human government. Positivism is narrow in its approach, and limited to the 
nature and ability of the sovereign. Natural law is firmly grounded in justice and real 
truth. Positivism builds upon the shifting sands of political power. Natural law 
transcends, and is grounded in an extrinsic source; the eternal law of God made knowable 
to man via the imago dei. Positivism can only see law as it is, and cannot distinguish 
between the valid government of a free people and a group of robbers exerting their will 
over masses of victims. In short, under natural law, everyone, even the state, has to 
adhere to a greater and higher authority. 
The implications of this line of thinking are compounded when one considers that 
just like any man before God, nation-states have a duty to their constituents to act in a 
moral manner, as the point of law is to promote what the mind would recognize as right. 
For there truly is a fundamental moral law that is above man, establishing natural law’s 
authority ultimately grounded in God’s eternal law. The fact that we are made in the 
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image of God, created with a conscience and intellect to discern good from evil, cuts to 
the heart of any excuse that we would lay down before Him. Natural law’s basic precepts 
are by the very nature of the imago dei can reasonably be known to all. Because the 
precepts of natural law are reasonably knowable, man-made law, in order to be just, 
should be made in accordance and not violate those precepts or principles that natural law 
articulates. When law does violate those precepts, it becomes unjust. It is not a law at all, 
but rather a perversion of it. 
In the case of the Nuremberg Trials, Hitler’s infamous discrimination laws which 
deprived the Jews of all their civil rights is a perfect example of a law that contradicts 
serving common good. The Nazi discrimination laws should not have been perceived as 
law at all. Had the prosecution at Nuremberg adopted a natural law approach to the Nazi 
question for conviction, it would have provided them with legitimate grounds to do so. 
In closing, natural law could have been a viable jurisprudential philosophy at the 
Nuremberg Trials. Under a natural law paradigm where the basic tenets of morality, such 
as “do not murder,” and “punish only the guilty” are not only right for all, but are known 
to all, corrupt human institutions like Hitler’s Third Reich would be accountable. The 
leaders who planned mass murder, extermination, enslavement, and deportation of entire 
peoples would have never been able to hide behind the skirts of legal positivism and 
Jarheiss’ employment of Austin’s command theory.   
Rather than straining to “desperately apply the discipline of the law to statesmen” 
via international law based on the dubious bindings of ineffectual treaties such as the 
Kellogg-Briand pact, there should have been a re-recognition of the universal 
applicability of the natural law. Indeed, as the Eichmann Trial showed, the question of 
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natural laws’ viability as a jurisprudential philosophy is made manifest. The Israeli 
court’s masterful handling of the writings of natural lawyers helped present a solution to 
one of the most troubling problems besetting natural law as an international force: the 
problem of jurisdiction. By addressing the universal character of the sin of genocide, the 
court was able to establish the presence of a universal jurisdiction based on natural law 
through the writings of Blackstone, Coke and Grotius. Instead of separating morality 
from law as the positivists would, the Israeli court embraced it, resulting in a well-
founded conviction ending in just execution. This stands in stark contrast to the 
Nuremberg Trials where many other Nazi leaders under positivist philosophy simply 
walked or received minimal sentences. 
Historically, perhaps no set of trials shows the elemental conflict between the two 
theories on the validity of law more than the Nuremberg Trials. It is unfortunate that the 
international military tribunal at Nuremberg so readily cast out natural law in looking to 
convict the Nazis. However, they still could not escape the power of the natural law to 
condemn evil. That is why Justice Jackson, in his opening speech to the trial, utilized 
natural law to give moral bite into his opening statement when speaking of the millions 
upon millions of dead at the Nazis’ hands: “Does it take these men by surprise that 
murder is treated as a crime?”  (The Law of the Case section, para. 9). 
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